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A JUDGE'S VIEW
JOHN J. TODD*
In January 1972 I was appointed to the Supreme Court of
Minnesota. I had hardly found the other judges' offices and had
barely occupied my office when the supreme court administrator
advised me that I must immediately fill out forms so that
arrangements could be made for me to attend the appellate
judges' seminar to be held the coming summer at New York Uni-
versity. I subsequently discovered that I had not been singled out,
but that all members of our court, before my time and since I was
appointed, have attended the N.Y.U. seminar.'
During the seminar I became acquainted with Bob Leflar
and had the opportunity to participate with great enthusiasm in
the entire two-week session. I was fascinated by Bob's presenta-
tion of issues and methods of treating problems in the conflict-
of-laws area because I had dealt with some of these problems in
my practice. As fate would have it, when I returned for the fall
session of court, the second case assigned to me was Milkovich v.
Saari.2 The Milkovich case is classic material for one of Bob
Leflar's seminars. It involved two residents of Ontario, Canada,
who were involved in an automobile accident while traveling in
Minnesota. The injured passenger was hospitalized in Minne-
sota and, upon recovery, returned to Canada. Ontario had a
guest statute which seemed to preclude recovery on the facts
of the case. Therefore, she commenced an action in Minnesota,
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Minnesota.
1. Professor Leflar has written a number of articles about his involvement in these
seminars and about the subject of continuing education generally. See R. LEFLAR, APPEL-
LATE JUDICL OPUnONS (1974); Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 321
(1974); Leflar, Seminars for Appellate Judges, 52 JUDICATURE 12 (1968); Leflar, The Appel-
late Judges Seminars, 21 ARK. L. REv. 190 (1967); Leflar, Continuing Education forAppel-
late Judges, 15 BuFFALo L. Rev. 370 (1965); Leflar, Seminar for Appellate Judges, 4 J.
Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 150 (1958); Leflar, The Appellate Judges Seminar at New York
University, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359 (1956); Leflar, Minimum Standards of JudicialAdminis-
tration-Arkansas, 5 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1950-51).
Several delightful essays appear in an issue of the Arkansas Law Review especially
devoted to Bob Leflar entitled Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Dedication to Robert A. Leflar,
Distinguished Professor of Law, 25 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1971). Several tell of his work in the
field of judicial education; see, e.g., Kenison, The Continuing Contribution of Robert A.
Leflar to the Judicial Education of Appellate Judges, id. at 95; Klein, Robert A.
Leflar-Institute of Judicial Administration Stalwart, id. at 112.
2. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
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seeking to recover under Minnesota law, which has never had a
guest statute.
In the Milkovich decision, we discussed the history of Minne-
sota law in this field, indicating that as late as 1958 Minnesota
had approved the lex loci rule.3 We had begun moving away from
that rule, however, and by 1966, in two cases, Balts v. Balts4 and
Kopp v. Rechtzigel, I we indicated our abandonment of the lex loci
rule on the grounds that it emphasized certainty and predictabil-
ity at the expense of other, frequently more relevant, considera-
tions. In these cases we were influenced by and cited with ap-
proval the landmark New York case of Babcock v. Jackson.6 Al-
though we had not yet adopted Leflar's choice-influencing consid-
erations, the results in both cases are consistent with his metho-
dology and both decisions apply what Leflar has identified as the
"better rule of law."
In Kopp, which is a Babcock-type case, we applied the Min-
nesota common-law rule of negligence, despite the existence of a
guest statute in South Dakota, where the accident occurred, and
allowed recovery by a Minnesota plaintiff against a Minnesota
defendant injured in the course of a trip that was to begin and
end in Minnesota. Such a "better law" result is more obvious in
Baits, in which we chose Minnesota law and at the same time
adopted a substantive rule of law permitting intra-family suits in
negligence.7
In 1972, in Bolgrean v. Stich,8 we attempted to collect our
prior decisions under the umbrella term "center of gravity."
Thus, our court was faced with the opportunity to reassess our
position and I was freshly and thoroughly inculcated with Bob
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. Milkovich provided us
the necessary vehicle for adoption of Leflar's concept and metho-
dology of dealing with choice-of-law problems. The fact that Min-
3. See Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958) (reiterating adherence
to the doctrine of lex loci).
4. 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
5. 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
6. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
7. Attention to the "better rule of law" is sanctioned not only by Leflar, but also by
others. See Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule". Threat and Promise in
Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1967). For particular attention to Balts and the
relation between choice-of-law methodology and the favored substantive rule of law, see
Felix, Interspousal Immunity in the Conflict of Laws: Automobile Accident Claims, 53
CORNELL L. REv. 406, 429 n.113 (1968). See generally Felix, The Choice-of-Law Process at
a Crossroads, 9 DuQ. L. Rsv. 413 (1971).
8. 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972).
[Vol. 31
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LEFLAR ON CONFLICTS
nesota moved in this direction should not have come as a great
surprise, particularly in the light of our 1968 decision in
Schneider v. Nichols.' That opinion was written by then Asso-
ciate Justice Robert Sheran, who also had attended the seminar
for appellate judges at N.Y.U. and who presently serves as our
chief justice. In the Schneider case, Justice Sheran referred ex-
tensively to Bob Leflar's writings in the field,'0 and although he
did not specifically adopt Leflar's methodology, he did embrace
its concept. In Milkovich, we went ahead and adopted the Leflar
approach as our choice-of-law method.
Thereafter-and as I have subsequently learned-almost
predictably a law review case comment appeared in the
Minnesota Law Review.'1 The comment writer was less than en-
thusiastic about the Milkovich decision, indicating that the court
had returned to the rigid characteristics of the vested-rights
theory of the lex loci rule. (I add, since Professor Rosenberg is a
fellow participant in this discussion, that the law review writer
cites Neumeier v. Kuehner2 as an express rejection by the New
York Court of Appeals of the "better law doctrine."' 13) Subsequent
decisions showed that it is not necessarily wise to write law review
comments so soon after a decision is handed down because the
court may have in mind some further expansion of the doctrine
originally enunciated.
The next reference to Milkovich appeared in a footnote in
Alside, Inc. v. Larson.'" I will come back to this in my discussion
of another case. Also appearing with Alside in the same volume
of the Minnesota Reports was the case of Schwartz v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. of Delaware.'" This case involved an
action by a Minnesota resident against a Minnesota trucking firm
for an accident that occurred in Indiana. The plaintiff, an over-
road hauler, was hospitalized for some time in Indiana and then
returned to Minnesota for treatment. Indiana allowed contribu-
9. 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
10. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 1584 (1966); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966).
11. 58 MINN. L. REV. 199 (1973).
12. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
13. 58 MINN. L. REV. 199, 207 (1973). Cf. Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson:
An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1967).
14. 300 Minn. 285, 293 n.2, 220 N.W.2d 274, 279 n.2 (1974).
15. 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert. denied sub nor. Spector & Freight
Sys., Inc. of Illinois v. Schwartz, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
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tory negligence as a complete defense, while Minnesota had
adopted comparative negligence. The case was tried before a jury,
which submitted comparative negligence findings that concluded
defendants were ninety percent negligent and plaintiff ten per-
cent negligent. The trial court, however, entered a verdict for
defendants on the ground that Indiana law applied. We reversed
and ordered an entry of judgment for the plaintiff using the
Milkovich doctrine and Professor Leflar's methodology. Our court
stated in that case: "Adoption of this methodology by this court
in Milkovich has in effect replaced the traditional choice-of-law
rules with a flexible approach which takes into account policy as
well as factual considerations in arriving at a choice of law in a
given situation." 6
This statement seems to summarize what impressed me
about Bob Leflar's methodology. It appeared to be a common-
sense approach to complement Minnesota's goal of providing ac-
cess to our courts if the nature of the controversy or the residence
of the plaintiffs entitled them to use our courts. This approach is
consistent with our constitutional mandate, which is part of the
Minnesota Bill of Rights, and which provides that "[e]very per-
son is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries or
wrongs which he may receive to his person, property, or character,
and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and
without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the
laws.""7
The court is philosophically committed to this goal, and I
believe the members of our present court feel that the adoption
of Leflar's methodology in the field of conflict of laws has been
an invaluable tool in achieving our justice-seeking purpose.
We subsequently had an opportunity to consider and apply
these principles in the case of Myers v. Government Employees
Insurance Co.'" In that case, a Minnesota resident was involved
in an accident in Louisiana with a Louisiana resident. Louisiana
has a one-year statute of limitations and a direct-action statute.
Negotiations were undertaken but no settlement was reached
within the year. The insurance company advised that no claim
could be made. The Minnesota resident then brought an action
in the Minnesota courts, asserting jurisdiction over the insurance
16. 300 Minn. at 491, 221 N.W.2d at 668.
17. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974).
[Vol. 31
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company, which did business in Minnesota, and limiting her
claim to the amount of the insurance coverage. We allowed the
action and based our procedure on the Leflar methodology. In
that case we also had occasion to discuss "false" conflicts of law
in limited detail. This matter has been better handled by Bob
Leflar in his article on the subject, 9 and elsewhere, than by my-
self.
The Alside21 case, previously referred to, fits into the category
of false conflicts. There a Minnesota resident signed a noncompe-
tition contract with his employer, an Ohio corporation. He was
employed in Minnesota, but the contract was signed in Ohio.
Minnesota law permitted such provisions but the employee con-
tended that Ohio law did not. Our court indicated that Ohio law
was the same as Minnesota law and, that therefore, there was no
conflict, citing Leflar's American Conflicts Law, 21 and the
Milkovich case. Our court then said that even if Ohio law were
different, that difference would be of no consequence since the
parties intended the clause to be enforceable and the law giving
effect to this intent should apply. There was no need to discuss
governmental interests or contacts with the respective states to
compare their respective interests.
I believe the result in Alside is correct as it relates to private
contracts. However, we presently have before our court a petition
for reargument in an insurance case in which we originally held
that insurance contracts would not be considered in the same
light as private contracts.22 In that case we originally held that
we would permit a representative to recover against an insurance
company under the "stacking" provision of Minnesota law. The
accident happened in Wisconsin and all parties involved were
Wisconsin residents. The decedent husband owned three vehi-
cles. He was employed in Minnesota and lived immediately
across the border in Wisconsin. His widow moved to Minnesota
shortly after the accident and remarried, this time to a Minnesota
resident. We originally held that the fact of employment in Min-
nesota and proximity of residence to the state border created
sufficient foreseeable and actual contacts with Minnesota to sat-
19. Leflar, True "False Conflicts," et Alia, 48 B.U.L. REv. 164 (1968).
20. 300 Minn. 285, 220 N.W.2d 274 (1974).
21. Id. at 293 n.2, 220 N.W.2d at 279 n.2, citing R. LEmFU, AmucAN CONFLICTS LAW
§ 103 at 239 (2d ed. 19f68).
22. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Inc., No. - (Minn. Sup. Ct., filed Apr. 7, 1978) (unre-
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isfy due process requirements for application of Minnesota law.
In the fall of 1975, Professor Davies, better known to me as
Senator Davies, co-authored an article on choice of law. 3 In this
article he urged adoption of the "seat-of-the-relationship" doc-
trine as a method to more fairly explain the rulings in conflict-
of-laws cases, and advocated that this was a more predictable
rule. Senator Davies filed an amicus brief with our court there-
after, hoping that we could adopt his views. Unfortunately, I do
not see that occurring in light of our recent decision in Blamey v.
Brown.2 It is an interesting case because of the manner in which
jurisdiction is achieved over a nonresident seller of intoxicating
liquors whose conduct contributed to foreseeable injury in Minne-
sota. Although the court rejects the statutory dram-shop provi-
sions of Minnesota as being inapplicable to the Wisconsin
purveyor, the court does apply common-law rights of recovery
which we had established in previous decisions in our state. In
this case we quoted with approval the Leflar methodology, but
rejected his suggestion 2 that We apply the same methodology to
construe statutory provisions. We did, of course, have available
the same result through the application of our common-law rule.
The case was an easy one except for the fact that defendant had
not procured liability insurance that would cover the facts sued
upon. This clearly affected the choice-influencing consideration
of predictability of results, but the foreseeability of such an acci-
dent, the stronger pull of the forum's governmental interests, and
the better rule of law, carried the day.
I would like to comment a bit on the attitude of our court
toward taking jurisdiction in these conflicts cases. As my col-
league, Justice Rogosheske, pointed out recently in Follese v.
Eastern Airlines, 26 our approach to the problem is not whether we
have jurisdiction to the exclusion of some other state or whether
our state's interests or contacts are greater or more significant
than those of another state having an interest measured by con-
ventional choice-of-law tests employed in such cases as Milkovich
v, Saari." Rather, we have attempted to articulate what we call
a legitimate-interest test emphasizing the interest of Minnesota
23. Davies & Rathke, Choice of Law Based on the Seat of the Relationship, 10 VAL.
L. REv. 1 (1975).
24. 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978).
25. See R. LEFLAR, AMmaICicA CoNmmcms LAw 189-92 (3d ed. 1977).
26. 271 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1978).
27. Id. at 829.
[Vol. 31
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in providing a forum, particularly in cases involving Minnesota
residents. Overall, the facts we consider are: (1) the quantity of
the contacts with the forum; (2) the nature and quality of the
contacts; (3) the source and connection of the cause of action with
the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum; and (5) the convenience to the parties.21
Regarding a more controversial matter, the Seider proce-
dure-we had our say before Shaffer v. Heitner9 and continue to
have our say. Here I refer to our decision in Sauchuk v. Rush.3"
In Savchuk we allowed the garnishment of a nonresident's insur-
ance coverage because his carrier did business in Minnesota. In
a 4-to-3 decision, we upheld our pre-Shaffer decision that due
process was satisfied. My dissenting colleagues were of the opin-
ion that the reason our earlier decision had been vacated and
remanded by the United States Supreme Court was that the
Court was directing us to read Shaffer as inviting us to abandon
the Seider procedure. 31 Those of us on the majority, however, felt
that our decision was consistent with the due process standards
of Shaffer because of Minnesota's interest in providing a forum
to Minnesota residents. Our statute, as interpreted in our earlier
opinion, protects against exceeding the limits of due process first
set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington" because the
nonresident defendant is guaranteed notice, his liability is lim-
ited to the face amount of the policy, and the procedure may be
utilized only by residents of the forum state.33 In this analysis we
agree with New York's post-Shaffer upholding of the Seider pro-
cedure, especially in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 3 a case
in which the Second Circuit followed its own pre-Shaffer justifi-
cation of Seider in Minichiello v. Rosenberg. 5
I think the important thing to remember for jurisdiction as
28. Sausser v. Republic Mortgage Investors, 269 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1978), relying
on Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) and Mid-Continent
Freight Lines v. Highway Trailers Indus., 291 Minn. 251, 255, 190 N.W.2d 670, 673 (1971).
29. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
30. 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated in light of Shaffer, 433 U.S. 902
(1977), aff'd on rehearing, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 99 S.Ct. 1211
(1979), oral argument heard, Rush v. Savchuk, 48 U.S.L.W. 3238 (Oct. 9, 1979).
31. 272 N.W.2d at 893 (Otis, J., dissenting).
32. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33. See 272 N.W.2d at 891.
34. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978).
35. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
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well as for choice of law is that we are dealing, for the most part,
with multistate carriers who contract to provide coverage for per-
sons engaged in an obviously mobile activity that will probably
cross state lines at almost any time. Automobile insurance poli-
cies, when examined from the viewpoint of the forum's govern-
mental interests, either to provide a forum or a substantive rule,
are not the same type of thing as contracts between private par-
ties. We almost take the view that any company writing insur-
ance today has to contemplate that the insured is going to operate
in fifty states and is going to be subject to fifty rules of law. Thus,
it does not seem unfair for us to provide a forum for one of our
residents in such cases or to apply our own rules of law within due
process limits.
More generally, I look at jurisdiction with a stricter sense of
due process than I do in applying the Leflar methodology in mak-
ing a choice of law. At least in my view, the requirements of due
process appear less restrictive in choice of law than in jurisdic-
tion. After we take jurisdiction, the consideration of our govern-
mental interests tends to blend into considerations of the best
result we can reach on the facts of the case. I think that is where
Bob Leflar's work comes in. Not only is the use of choice-
influencing considerations a practical guide to the justice-
dispensing functions of our courts, but it is a very good way of
keeping before us what we are actually doing.
[Vol. 31
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